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II. Banks and the changing nature of risks  




The Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region has been more prone to financial crises than 
other regions of the world (IADB (2004)). This is illustrated by the number of financial crises 
per country between 1973 and 2004, and the high recurrence of banking crises per country 
(see Table 2.1). Although banking crises are the ultimate manifestation of a financial 
system’s vulnerability, they have also revealed themselves in the region through limited, 
costly and volatile credit to the private sector. This vulnerability results from changes in the 
banking environment due in large measure to financial innovation and liberalisation. As a 
result, banking sectors in the region have faced a wide and complex range of new risks.  
This chapter assesses the evolution of macroeconomic, market, credit and liquidity risks in 
LAC. It also explores the potential risks associated with changes in the structure of banking 
sectors. In addition, the chapter provides a brief discussion of the current capacity of banks 
to manage these risks and the implications that this has for the health of banking sectors.  
Macroeconomic risks 
Macroeconomic imbalances and external shocks appear to be main sources of banking 
sector fragility. However, in smaller economies important macroeconomic risks may result 
from a lack of economic diversification, making the banking systems of these countries highly 
dependent on the fortunes of the main sectors of the economy and, therefore, even more 
vulnerable to external shocks than in larger economies. These issues are reviewed below. 
Macroeconomic imbalances  
Domestic macroeconomic imbalances (eg large fiscal deficits or excessive debt levels) have 
contributed to the fragility of LAC’s banking sectors. Indeed, high monetary growth has often 
been a leading indicator of bank fragility in the region. Moreover, empirical evidence 
indicates that high inflation, low GDP growth, high real interest rates, and fiscal deficits are 
highly correlated with the occurrence of banking crises (Dermigüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(2005)). Although such imbalances have been reduced in recent years, the nature of the 
risks facing banks seems to have changed. On the one hand, better macroeconomic 
management practices, which have manifested themselves in more transparent and prudent 
monetary policies or in more appropriate debt management  practices, have reduced 
                                                  
1  The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the BIS. I 
wish to thank Ramon Moreno and Serge Jeanneau for their detailed comments and suggestions. I also 
acknowledge useful comments by Már Gudmundsson, Gregor Heinrich and meeting participants. 
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 macroeconomic risk.
2 In particular, flexible exchange rate regimes have helped reduce 
currency misalignments and created incentives for lower currency mismatches. On the other 
hand, a greater reliance on market-determined interest and exchange rates in the larger 
countries has increased market risk, requiring careful and more active risk management. In 
some smaller economies the change in the exchange rate regime has had other implications. 
For instance, in Ecuador and El Salvador currency risk has been eliminated as a result of 
official or “de jure” dollarisation. However, this has raised an important issue. While full 
dollarisation and fixed exchange rate regimes eliminate short-term volatility, they carry 
(unless they are fully credible) the risk of a sudden devaluation. Furthermore, currencies 
fixed (or quasi-fixed) to the US dollar might offer fewer opportunities for diversification. 
Table 2.1 
Dates and durations of banking crises 
in selected LAC countries, 1980–2005 
Country Crises 
Argentina  1980–82,1989–90,1995, 2001–05  
Bolivia 1986–88,1994–97,  2001–05 
Brazil 1990,1994–99 
Chile 1981–87 
Colombia 1982–85,  1999–2000 
1994–97
1 Costa Rica 
Dominican Republic  2003–05  
Ecuador 1995–2005   
El Salvador  1989 
Guyana 1993–95 
Jamaica 1996–2000 




Uruguay 1981–85,  2002 
Venezuela 1993–97 
Note: Events were defined as crises if one of the following criteria was met: (i) the ratio of non-performing 
assets to total assets in the banking system exceeded 10%; (ii) the cost of the rescue operation was at least 
2% of GDP; (iii)  large-scale nationalisation of banks took place; (iv) extensive bank runs took place or 
emergency measures such as freezes, prolonged bank holidays, or generalised deposit guarantees were 
enacted by the government in response to events. 
1  Uncertain end-date. Four-year duration assumed. 
Source: Dermigüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005). 
                                                  
2   See for instance Jeanneau and Tovar (2006) and IADB (2006) for an analysis of the development of domestic 
bond markets in Latin America. See Tovar (2005) for an analysis of new sovereign issues denominated in 
domestic currency in Latin America.  
18  BIS Papers No 33
 
 External shocks 
Banking sectors in the region have also been vulnerable to external shocks that could 
produce significant losses or even crises, such as sudden reversals in capital inflows, 
currency crises or adverse shocks to terms of trade. Research suggests that such 
vulnerability is often the result of currency and maturity mismatches, which lead to losses 
when an adverse external shock triggers depreciation or a sudden withdrawal of deposits 
from the domestic banking system.  
There are reasons to believe that open economies today are less vulnerable to external 
shocks that could impair the functioning of the banking system.  
First, countries have adopted more stable macroeconomic policies. For instance, fiscal 
consolidation has improved significantly across the region. Furthermore, fiscal responsibility 
laws have also been enacted (eg in Brazil)
 and rules have been introduced with a view to 
achieving structural fiscal surpluses (eg in Chile).
3 As a result, in 2005 only Colombia, 
Guatemala and Honduras had primary deficits in LAC (ECLAC (2006)). Macroeconomic 
stability has also been achieved through the adoption of flexible exchange rates  and inflation 
targeting (IT) regimes (eg in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru). 
Important progress is also being made in some of the smaller economies, as reflected by the 
slow convergence towards the adoption of floating exchange rates or IT regimes, for instance 
in Costa Rica, Jamaica or Uruguay.
Second, countries in the region have improved the structure of their debt. In larger 
economies of the region, such as Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, this has been the result 
of deliberate efforts to lengthen the maturity of debt and shift its composition (Jeanneau and 
Tovar (2006)).  
Third, international reserves across the region have increased significantly over the last 
decade. For instance, during 2004 and 2005 the Caribbean economies accumulated 
international reserves at rates that exceeded 20% per year.  
Finally, the region has observed a sustained improvement in its current account. However, 
this improvement has been less general than expected. Despite the existence of a regional 
current account surplus since 2003, most of the smaller economies in the region still exhibit 
significant current account deficits. In 2005 some countries, such as Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama, still had deficits in excess of 4%. 
Overall, countries in the region might now be more resilient should the currently favourable 
international conditions (high international liquidity, strong growth, high commodity prices) 
come to an end. Indeed, an index incorporating the real effective exchange rate, the current 
account balance, export growth and three indicators pertaining to external debt (the ratio of 
international bond and bank debt as a percentage of GDP (level and change in the debt 
indicator in per cent over two years) and short-term debt as a percentage of foreign reserves 
shows that the region has moved (with a lag relative to other developing regions of the world) 
from a situation of high vulnerability in the 1990s and early 2000s to one of low vulnerability 
in the last few years (Graph 2.1).
4 This improvement might also explain the sharp 
improvement of sovereign ratings across the region. 
                                                  
3  In the case of Brazil the fiscal responsibility law strengthened fiscal institutions and established a broad 
framework for fiscal planning, execution and transparency at the federal, state and municipal levels.  
4  These indicators are calculated by the BIS following Hawkins and Klau (2000). 
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1  An increase in the index (expressed as a weighted average, based on 2000 GDP and PPP exchange rates of 
the economies in each group) implies an increase in risk.    
2  Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Thailand.    
3    China, Hong Kong SAR, India, Singapore and Taiwan (China).       
4  Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.    
5  The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia and Turkey. 
Sources: IMF; national data; BIS; BIS calculations. 
For the region’s smaller economies, additional external risks elements need to be 
considered. On the one hand, their lower degree of financial openness may reduce their 
vulnerability to capital flow reversals. On the other hand, their economic structure might also 
make them more sensitive to terms of trade shocks. During the last few years, rising oil 
prices have caused a sharp deterioration in the terms of trade of LAC’s smaller oil importing 
economies. In some countries, inflation has risen requiring tighter monetary policies; Costa 
Rica is a case in point. The terms of trade deterioration has also been associated with a 
worsening of the trade balance. Under such circumstances, progress made in other areas of 
the economy will determine its ultimate vulnerability. 
Another factor that could increase the vulnerability of small open economies and their 
banking sectors to external shocks is lack of export diversification (Narain et al (2003)). In 
order to assess the relevance of this argument, the correlations of non-performing loans with 
GDP growth, export growth in the main sectors of the economy and terms of trade are 
reported in Table 2.2.
5 During the last decade, most countries in the region have, as 
expected, shown a significant negative correlation between non-performing loans and the 
level of economic activity. Uruguay and Chile show the highest negative correlation. In the 
case of export growth, the Dominican Republic appears to be the most vulnerable. The 
correlation between non-performing loans and the terms of trade should in general be 
negative as an increase in export prices or a decrease in import prices should increase either 
                                                  
5    This exercise is in the spirit of Narain et al (2003) for a different sample of developing countries. More 
generally, the concentration of loan portfolios is an important consideration for credit risk. Although banking 
supervision in most countries incorporates the risk of large credit exposures to a private borrower or group of 
closely related borrowers, it often ignores the possibility that a bank may have a concentrated book, that is, 
one which contains a relatively high proportion of sizeable single exposures, even if none of them is especially 
large. This kind of risk can be magnified if borrowers are linked to a common economic activity or industry 
sector. Although real estate is generally a sector that attracts specific exposure limits, in many economies no 
prudential limits are imposed on other sectoral concentrations (eg the export sector). Risks arising from banks 
with undiversified loan portfolios occur in many economies but if all banks in the economy have similarly 
undiversified portfolios, this can create significant systemic risk. In smaller LAC economies, this is a possibility 
as the return of many assets can be linked to the performance of the main sector(s) of the economy. 
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 profits or real consumption wages. Table 2.2 shows that this is generally the case (only 


























































9         
Colombia –0.61  2.4  0.58  35.7  0.60  16.6  –0.82  7.0 
Ecuador –0.41  3.3  0.85  77.6 0.85 59.6 0.40  5.5 
Mexico 0.58  2.3  0.42  25.4 0.01 24.5  –0.77  2.5 
Venezuela –0.66  7.8  0.38  75.2 0.15 59.0  –0.16  18.8 
Other countries                 
Argentina –0.56  6.5  0.37  90.8 0.43 82.6  –0.28  6.7 
Bolivia  –0.42 1.4 –0.00 35.3 –0.00  27.7 –0.23  3.5 
Brazil 0.55  1.6  –0.40  13.5  –0.31  16.4  –0.80  6.7 
Chile  –0.88 2.4 –0.55  6.5  –0.27  8.6  –0.71  9.3 
Costa  Rica  –0.43 2.7 –0.34 90.0  –0.36 66.9  –0.54  5.8 
Dominican 
Republic 0.76  3.0  –0.80  414.9 –0.75 218.2  0.87  2.1 
El Salvador  0.28  0.9  –0.06 35.8  –0.02 31.4  –0.32  6.9 
Guatemala  –0.20 0.9 –0.39 23.0 –0.27  17.4  0.10  7.6 
Haiti 0.57  2.2  0.29  128.7 0.19  108.8 0.57  4.7 
Honduras –0.06  2.0  0.26  35.9 0.34 36.3  –0.42  10.5 
Nicaragua  –0.20 1.7 –0.66 27.6 –0.73  26.8 –0.30 12.7 
Panama 0.26  2.2  –0.28  16.0 –0.01  9.6  0.42  3.3 
Paraguay  –0.50 2.4 –0.25 26.9 0.08 21.4  –0.75  8.1 
Peru –0.48  2.4  0.03  21.0  0.06  13.0  –0.74  10.8 
Uruguay –0.91  6.2  0.34  39.1 0.31 30.1 0.19  8.4 
1  Impaired loans as a percentage of total assets.   
2  Correlation coefficient.   
3  Standard deviation over annual 
data.   
4  Of real GDP in national currency.   
5  Most important three-digit SITC export sector.     
6 Deflated by 
general export unit values.    
7 Two most important three-digit SITC export sectors.   
8  Starting date may differ 
depending on data availability.   
9  SITC 333 “Crude petroleum” was the most important export commodity in 
2003. 
Sources: IMF; UNCTAD; Fitch Bankscope. 
                                                  
6   Attempts to establish a relation between these correlations and the degree of trade and financial openness 
show no clear pattern. 
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 Overall, the region has made important progress in different areas that are likely to reduce its 
vulnerability to external shocks. However, despite this progress it is still necessary to 
consolidate it, in particular in the smaller economies. Many countries still remain vulnerable 
to large real exchange rate fluctuations. Furthermore, large external shocks will still create 
difficulties given the high debt levels and the persistence of currency and maturity 
mismatches (in particular in the private sector) in some countries (Goldstein and Turner 
(2004) and Jeanneau and Tovar (2006)).  
Market, credit and liquidity risks 
Financial markets are subject to various sources of risk: credit, market, liquidity, operational 
and legal risks. These risks tend to be more pronounced in the developing world than in 
developed countries due to a lower level of economic, financial and institutional 
development. Credit risk tends to be more acute as a result of a lack of highly rated 
counterparties. Market and liquidity risks are higher due to thinly traded markets. Operational 
risks may also be exacerbated because of inadequate human resources or the failure of 
manual, mechanical or electronic systems to process payments. Finally, legal risk may also 
be part of the environment (for instance, due to the inability to foreclose on collateral). This 
section highlights some important elements and changes in the nature of risks that are 
relevant for the region. 
Market risk 
Market risk reflects the sensitivity of income and balance sheet positions to changes in asset 
prices. The importance of this risk has evolved through time. To take an example, in the 
highly regulated systems of the past interest rates did not have a significant allocative 
function. However, under more liberal regimes interest rates have become more volatile. 
Banks are therefore becoming more exposed to interest rate risk and are not always well 
prepared to handle it due to the lack of suitable hedging instruments (Turner (2003)). 
Bank credit to the public sector is an important source of market risk. During the last decade, 
bank credit to the government as a percentage of total bank assets has increased in most 
countries in the region, for example in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica and Jamaica 
(see Graph 2.2 and Table A8). Low risk weights and a perceived lack of other investment 
opportunities seem to have led banks to build portfolios that rely excessively on government 
debt. Vargas (2006) illustrates the risks of such large holdings of government securities. A  
stress test applied to the Colombian financial system reveals that a 100 bp increase in yields 
across all maturities of government securities (TES) would cause losses close to 17% of the 
profits obtained by credit institutions and 2.5% of the value of their portfolios as of May 2005. 
Vargas argues that the financial system is willing to accept a growing exposure to domestic 
public debt because of the absence of assets with returns that are negatively correlated with 
this debt, because market risk is underestimated, or because of moral hazard (the 
expectation of a bailout). Inefficient aggregate and private risk sharing and problems in 
measuring risk are the main deficiencies that need to be addressed. Aggregate risk sharing, 
for instance, could be dealt with by allowing greater participation by foreign investors.
7 The 
                                                  
7   Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay have tried to diversify their investor base by the issuance of global bonds 
denominated in local currency. For a discussion of this issue see Tovar (2005). 
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 insufficient level of individual risk sharing appears to be associated with the lack of legal 
protection for the holders of guarantees, which is inhibiting the development of liquid repo 
and securities lending markets, the incomplete regulation of securities lending and the lack of 
a benchmark to price short- and long-run forward rate agreements. 
Graph 2.2 














































































AG = Antigua and Barbuda; AN = Netherlands Antilles; AR = Argentina; BB = Barbados; BO = Bolivia; 
BR  =  Brazil; BS = Bahamas; BZ = Belize; CL = Chile; CO = Colombia; CR = Costa Rica; DM = Dominica; 
DO = Dominican Republic; EC = Ecuador; GD = Grenada; GT = Guatemala; GY = Guyana; HN = Honduras; 
HT = Haiti; JM = Jamaica; KN = St Kitts; LC = St Lucia; MX = Mexico; NI = Nicaragua; PA = Panama; PE = Peru; 
PY = Paraguay; SR = Suriname; SV = El Salvador; TT = Trinidad and Tobago; UY = Uruguay; VC = St Vincent 
and the Grenadines; VE = Venezuela.  
1  Deposit money banks’ claims on the government as a percentage of total bank assets.  
Source: IMF. 
Credit risk 
The risk that a debt issuer will default is known as credit risk; this is typically the most 
important form of risk for commercial banks. In assessing credit risk, an institution needs to 
consider three issues: default probabilities over the horizon of the obligation, credit exposure 
(ie how large the obligation is when the default occurs) and the recovery rate (ie what part of 
the exposure may be recovered through bankruptcy proceedings or some other form of 
settlement).  
Credit risk in LAC is often difficult to assess due to the lack of information on the credit 
history and financial position of borrowers, inadequate accounting practices and standards 
that make it difficult to evaluate credit exposures, macroeconomic volatility and deficiencies 
in the institutional environment (eg political instability). Weak enforcement of creditor rights 
may also contribute to uncertainty regarding recovery rates. Although many of these factors 
have been improving in recent years, progress in some cases is slow.  
Moreno (2006) highlights two key issues related to credit risk that are relevant for emerging 
market economies (EMEs). First, the distinct increase in the share of credit to the household 
sector that has been observed in a number of countries could lower credit risk if the 
concentration of bank assets fell, if consumer credit diversifies risk among a larger number of 
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 borrowers and if profits in consumer lending proves to be more stable. However, credit risk 
could rise if banks are lending in new market segments. Second, there is significant credit 
risk associated with the effects of asset price fluctuations on banking books. One concern in 
this case is the volatility associated with property prices, a phenomenon that appears to be 
quite generalised both in EMEs and in LAC, particularly in Colombia and Mexico. Another 
concern is exchange rate volatility, which can lead to credit risk in financially dollarised 
economies. We turn to this subject next. 
Dollarisation and financial fragility 
A key source of credit risk in the region is associated with its high level of financial 
dollarisation. Currency mismatches increase risks embedded in firms’ and banks’ balance 
sheets (Goldstein and Turner (2004)). Graph 2.3 reports a measure of financial dollarisation 
(calculated as the ratio of total foreign currency deposits in the domestic banking system to 
total deposits). As can be seen, the level of dollarisation is high across the region, notably in 
Bolivia, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay.  
Dollarisation only increases banking sector vulnerability if it leads to currency mismatches (ie 
unhedged positions in foreign currency). Goldstein and Turner (2004) and IADB (2004) 
report evidence showing that these mismatches are important in the region, in particular, in 
Peru, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Costa Rica. However, additional evidence reported by 
Jeanneau and Tovar (2006) suggests that there has been a decline in currency mismatches 










SV PA EC BO UY NI PE PY CR SR TT HN JM KN AG BB CL GT BZ AR GD DM VC MX LC VE BR CO  
Note: For a list of the countries included here, see Graph 2.2. 
1  Total foreign currency deposits in the domestic banking system to total deposits; 2004 data, in per cent. 
Source: Moody’s Investors Service. 
The literature has highlighted the various risks for the region’s banking sectors associated 
with dollarisation. De Nicolo et al (2003) show that highly dollarised banking sectors are 
characterised by higher insolvency risks and higher deposit volatility, while Domaç and 
Martinez (2000) find that high levels of dollarisation are positively correlated with the 
probability of local banks facing systemic crises. In contrast Arteta (2003) fails to find a link 
between dollarisation and the probability of a crisis. Levy-Yeyati (2005) revisits the issue 
using two measures of financial dollarisation: the rate of deposit dollarisation and the ratio of 
local banks’ foreign currency liabilities and assets, which captures non-deposit dollarisation 
in the domestic banking system. He finds that the likelihood that an exchange rate change 
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 will lead to a crisis increases with the degree of financial dollarisation and shows that 
exchange rate shocks only have a negative impact on financial stability in the presence of 
financial dollarisation. In particular, his results indicate that the probability of a banking crisis 
after a 100% devaluation increases by 15 percentage points as a country moves from no 
dollarisation to full dollarisation. These results highlight the balance sheet link between 
financial dollarisation and fragility. 
Despite this evidence, one should not dismiss the possibility that financial dollarisation may 
have beneficial effects. A popular hypothesis is that it may foster local intermediation. 
Empirical evidence on this is scarce but some results, such as those reported by De Nicolo 
et al (2003), suggest that dollarisation is not necessarily associated with deeper markets. It 
only seems to have a positive effect in countries with a history of high inflation.  
Liquidity risks 
There are two main types of liquidity risk. The first is (market) liquidity risk, which is the risk 
that a bank will not be able to execute a transaction at a price that is close to the prevailing 
market price, thus exposing it to risks of losses in its positions. The second is funding risk. 
This is the risk that a bank will be unable to raise the necessary cash to roll over its debt or to 
meet cash, margin and collateral requirements to counterparties (eg deposit withdrawals). In 
many cases, this risk is magnified due to the underdevelopment or lack of securities markets.  
Why is liquidity risk a concern? As discussed in the next chapter, market liquidity is essential 
for the smooth functioning of modern financial systems. In LAC, markets tend to be illiquid, 
and this creates numerous problems. For instance, poor liquidity or a liquidity breakdown 
under stress can induce large changes in market prices and volatility, leading to substantial 
losses for market participants who rely on their ability to turn over positions quickly and at 
favourable prices. Modern risk management systems also depend on adequate levels of 
liquidity, mainly because they rely on the derivation of accurate benchmark rates for the 
pricing of portfolios and the smooth functioning of markets for the frequent rebalancing of 
positions.  
Funding risk is a major concern in the region for several reasons: First interbank markets in 
EMEs tend to be illiquid and quite volatile. Moreover, most transactions tend to take place 
between banks and central banks rather than between banks themselves. Such features limit 
the capacity of banks to manage cash flows as well as any other associated risks and 
therefore expose them to funding risk on a day to day basis. This also implies banks being 
forced to hold higher levels of reserves.  
Given the limited development of interbank and bond markets in the region, it seems natural 
to think that funding risk may be very relevant. However, assessing its importance is difficult 
due to the lack of appropriate data. Ideally, we would like to have a measure of, say, the 
liquidity gap;
8 that is, the difference, at all future dates, between banking portfolio assets and 
liabilities. Unfortunately such a measure is not available. For this reason we use as a proxy 
the deposit to credit ratio. An excess of deposits to credit would be indicative of an excess of 
funds. Such a situation would of course imply that there is no liquidity risk. However, it would 
generate interest rate risk, given that the value of the book is sensitive to changes in market 
rates. Of course, when deposits fall below loans there is a funding deficit and this would be 
                                                  
8   To measure liquidity risk one would ideally require a liquidity gap measure capturing the difference between 
outstanding balances of assets and liabilities over time. At any point in time a positive gap would thus be 
equivalent to a deficit, which would be measured as a cash amount. With such data it would then be possible 
to tabulate and/or chart the gap profile. 
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 indicative of problems for the bank as its long-term commitments would not be funded by its 
existing operations. At the end of 2005 all countries in the region had an excess of deposits 
over credit, thus suggesting a higher exposure to market than to liquidity risk (see Graph 
2.4). However, as illustrated in the same graph, this ratio appears to have been relatively 





















































































































Note: For a list of the countries included here, see Graph 2.2. 
1  Ratio of domestic deposits of deposit money banks (IFS, lines 24–26) to domestic credit of deposit money 
banks (IFS, lines 22, 22...). 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (IFS). 
One important aspect to keep in mind when assessing liquidity risk in the region is that 
liquidity is likely to change significantly with the business cycle and the evolution of risk 
aversion. A particular concern is the possibility of boom and bust cycles in which periods of 
ample liquidity are followed by periods of retrenchment and financial stress, with possibly 
adverse systemic implications. In fact, liquidity has often taken centre stage in recent crises 
(eg those in Argentina, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, Paraguay and 
Uruguay).  
Although the risks entailed by the high degree of financial dollarisation in the region have 
already been highlighted, it is worth stressing that liquidity and solvency risks are magnified 
by such a phenomenon. For instance, this occurs when there is inadequate backing for the 
dollar liabilities of banks. In such cases, an increase in country or banking risk may lead 
depositors or other creditors to convert their deposits or lines of credit into dollar cash or 
transfer them abroad. Unless banks have sufficient dollar assets abroad, they may run out of 
liquid dollar reserves and drain the central bank’s reserves. The Uruguayan crisis of 2002 is 
a good example of such fragilities in a highly-dollarised economy (De Brun and Licandro 
(2006)). In fully dollarised economies, such as Ecuador and El Salvador, systemic liquidity 
runs could also be a problem for the financial system in particular, given that the central bank 
is no longer a lender of last resort. 
The implications of market structure for risks 
Risks in the banking sector have also changed as a result of the evolving structure of the 
market. In this regard, an important issue is how risks are affected by bank ownership (state 
and foreign) and market consolidation.  
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 State and foreign ownership of banks 
State ownership is generally considered to be a source of risk for the banking sector as it 
reduces competition, productivity and economic growth (La Porta et al (2002) and Barth et al 
(2001)). Some evidence suggests that state-owned banks may even increase the probability 
of banking crises (Barth et al (2001)). However, despite these disadvantages, state-owned 
banks may also have a positive effect on risk. Some researchers have found that the credit 
extended by such banks is less procyclical than that extended by the private sector and that, 
in some cases, state-owned banks are as efficient as private banks (Mihaljek (2006)). 
Foreign ownership is claimed to improve operating efficiency, financial intermediation and 
long-term growth of the banking sector (Claessens et al (2001)). As a result, foreign banks 
may also improve the allocation of credit. In particular, by employing better risk management 
practices, foreign banks are likely to improve risk and return trade-offs. Studies further claim 
that foreign banks may reduce the volatility of credit (Crystal et al (2001)). Indeed, foreign 
banks may stabilise local credit in periods of stress given their ability to spread risk, retain 
local deposits and gain ready access to external funds (IMF (2000)). Some evidence further 
indicates that foreign banks may reduce the likelihood of banking crises by inducing stronger 
and less volatile loan growth than that generated by domestic banks (Dages et al (2000)). 
Despite these advantages, foreign ownership of banks may entail risks for the host country 
banking system as foreign banks may be less committed to the domestic banking system 
(see Chapter IV). An additional disadvantage is that foreign banks may transmit shocks from 
their home countries. In LAC most international bank lending comes from a narrow range of 
countries that are also the main consumers of exports from the region.
9 Therefore, an 
economic contraction and a downturn in the credit cycle in lending countries could affect LAC 
not only through a decline of external demand but also through a reduction in local credit, 
amplifying the regional business cycle. IADB (2004) presents empirical evidence showing 
that whether foreign banks stabilise or destabilise credit depends on the nature of shocks 
that affect the economy. Foreign banks increase credit volatility if shocks result from changes 
in local business opportunities but reduce it if the main source of credit volatility arises from 
the domestic supply of deposits.  
Market consolidation 
The process of market consolidation seen in the region (see Chapter I above) has important 
implications for the degree of competition in the banking sector and risks in banking. 
Privatisation and mergers have, for instance, been criticised for reducing competition. This 
process could in turn result in a system dominated by banks that are “too big to fail”. 
However, the evidence supports the notion that more concentrated banking systems reduce 
the probability of crises (Levy-Yeyati and Micco (2003)). Equally important, Gelos and Roldos 
(2002) and Levy-Yeyati and Micco (2003) find no evidence that the reduction in the number 
of banks translates into less competition. Furthermore, there does not seem to be any 
evidence indicating that greater competition is damaging to stability (Dermigüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2005)).  
                                                  
9   Spanish banks account for about a third of total foreign bank claims on Latin America (both cross-border and 
local claims), followed by the United States with a share of 22%. 
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 Has the capacity to manage risks improved? 
Risk management in the region appears to have improved during the past decade. This 
change is partly related to the dismantling of financial repression and the greater reliance on 
market-determined prices. Institutional conditions have also played a key role as many banks 
were previously state-owned and therefore subject to government guidelines on credit 
management. In the past, financial systems failed in many cases to show their weaknesses 
until after significant crises had occurred. For example, in the Dominican Republic, the recent 
collapse of the third largest bank in the country, Baninter, was the outcome of 
mismanagement and fraudulent banking practices as well as weak supervision. The banking 
system was also systemically vulnerable due to a large concentration of loans among a small 
group of borrowers and the substantial proportion of loans that had been granted to 
unhedged foreign currency borrowers (IADB (2004)). The high costs associated with financial 
crises and the persistent losses among public banks have led to significant improvements: 
banks have been privatised, supervisory and regulatory frameworks strengthened, and 
transparency and governance enhanced. There has also been a tendency to harmonise 
accounting standards and practices with international standards to some extent (see 
Chapter IV). 
Banks’ recognition of the importance of risk management is reflected, first, in the creation of 
in-house risk management units and, second, by the fact that risk management issues are 
now explicitly considered by banks’ boards of directors (Moreno (2006)). Furthermore, 
important technical improvements have taken place, including changes in the approach to 
valuation, the quantification of risks and the pricing and allocation of credit. Market agents and 
policy makers are also more aware of the risks associated with dollarisation which partly 
derives from the crises experienced by the region (eg Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay). This 
awareness is reflected today in the market preference for high dollar liquidity, either in the form 
of higher levels of international reserves or in higher reserve requirements on dollar deposits.
10
There has also been a shift towards fair value accounting. However, in many countries 
assets and liabilities are still valued at historic cost rather than at fair value. Despite its 
significant advantages, fair value accounting presents a number of problems, such as the 
absence of deep and liquid markets that would allow for an accurate measurement of 
positions. Some would also argue that the benefits of accounting for unrealised valuation 
changes are not clear. Such changes could lead to more volatile bank statements, making 
capital requirements more procyclical.  
There have also been improvements in the quantification of risks. Banks in the region are 
adopting more advanced techniques for risk assessment, such as value-at-risk, stress testing 
and credit scoring. Several difficulties arise, however, when implementing more sophisticated 
risk assessment techniques. One of them is the difficulty of obtaining data to calculate default 
probabilities; another is the lack of suitable techniques for designing and calibrating models 
to evaluate alternative scenarios. Finally, human capital and infrastructure, such as 
information technology, may also be lacking.
11
                                                  
10  Such “liquidity buffers” are costly, which is why some alternatives could be desirable. Ize, Kiguel and Levy-
Yeyati (2005) offer an interesting discussion of these issues and, in general, on managing liquidity risk in 
highly dollarised economies. 
11   For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see BIS (2006).  
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 Graph 2.5 







































































Note: For a list of the countries included here, see Graph 2.2. 
1  As a percentage of total average assets.  
Sources: Fitch Bankscope; BIS calculations. 
A key concern for the region has been the existence of very high intermediation margins over 
extended periods. This questions the extent to which better bank management is reflected in 
improved pricing. Graph 2.5 and Table A9a and A9b present evidence of such concerns by 
comparing several indicators of bank profitability for the period 1999-2000 with those for 
2003-04.
12 Although net interest margins show a modest decrease in most countries 
between the two periods, they have remained relatively high in several countries.
13 Indeed, 
such is the case in Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Nicaragua and 
Venezuela. Evidence (not reported) also shows that there is no visible trend in interest rate 
spreads, which in some cases remain quite high. For example, in Brazil, Paraguay and Haiti 
spreads have averaged 39.7%, 28.4% and 23.3%, respectively. 
Better management practices and reduced operating costs could lead to lower interest rate 
spreads or margins; operating costs appear for instance to be highly correlated with net 
interest margins or spreads (Graph 2.6). Other factors that may have important effects on 
pricing are those related to changes in market structure and growing competition, 
concentration risk and connected lending, government restrictions and deficiencies in the 
legal framework (Moreno (2006)). 
                                                  
12   Graph 2.5 must be interpreted with care as only the (limited) data available are reported. 
13  Net interest margins are defined as the difference between interest income and interest expenses, and are 
usually expressed as a percentage of average earning assets. 
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 Graph 2.6 




























































































































































Note: For a list of the countries included here, see Graph 2.2. 
1  As a percentage of total average assets; 2003–04 average.    
2  Spread between lending and deposit rates; 
2004, in per cent.  
Sources: IMF; Fitch Bankscope; BIS calculations. 
As is well known, the effectiveness of risk management also depends on the ability to hedge 
or transfer risks. An important issue in this respect is the lack of depth in asset and risk 
transfer markets in LAC. Markets for interest rate risk hedging in the region are either very 
recent or not available. In fact, yield curves for local currency fixed-rate government issues 
generally remain very short in most of the smaller economies of the region (see the 
discussion in Chapter III in this volume and Jeanneau and Tovar (2006)). 
Has the health of the banking system improved? 
The financial soundness of the banking system, as captured by indicators of banking 
performance, has improved in most countries of the region during the last decade. For 
example, the return on average assets has generally risen, although not in the Caribbean 
(Tables A10 and A11). Capital asset ratios have also increased in many countries in the 
region, although here the pattern is less generalised (Table A12). Furthermore, non-
performing loans have also experienced a significant decline in a large number of countries, 
as shown in Graph 2.7. 
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Note: For a list of the countries included here, see Graph 2.2. 
1  As a percentage of total loans. 
Source: IMF GFSR and Article IV. 
A key problem with the indicators mentioned above is that it is not clear how current 
measures of “good health” would fare over a cyclical downturn. Some perspective on this can 
be gained by examining the behaviour of bank ratings that exclude support, as presented in 
Tables A13 and A14. Table A13 shows the weighted average of Fitch individual banking 
ratings by country.
14 The indicator assigns a value of “0” for the lowest possible average and 
100 for the highest possible average rating. In almost all the countries for which data are 
available the indicator improves over the time period studied. Only countries that have 
experienced a severe crisis show a decline (eg the Dominican Republic or Venezuela). 
Similar results are obtained using Moody’s financial strength index, which has the advantage 
of providing a broader country sample (Table A14). 
Concluding remarks 
Overall, the banking sector of LAC has made important progress in dealing with the different 
and constantly changing risks with which it is faced. Risk management across the region 
                                                  
14  See Fitch Ratings (2004). According to Fitch, individual ratings are only assigned to banks. These ratings, 
which are internationally comparable, attempt to assess how a bank would be viewed if it were entirely 
independent and could not rely on external support. They are designed to assess a bank’s exposure to, 
appetite for, and management of risk. They thus represent Fitch’s view on the likelihood of the bank running 
into difficulties such that it would require support. The principal factors Fitch uses to evaluate banks and 
determine these ratings include profitability and balance sheet integrity (including capitalisation), franchise, 
management, operating environment, and prospects. Finally, consistency is an important consideration, as is 
a bank’s size (in terms of equity capital) and diversification (in terms of involvement in a variety of activities in 
different economic and geographical sectors). Individual ratings range from A to E. In addition, gradations may 
be used among the five ratings: ie A/B, B/C, C/D and D/E. 
 
BIS Papers No 33  31
 appears to have improved and the indicators of banking health are favourable. However, 
many challenges still lie ahead, including the implementation and adoption of better 
supervisory and regulatory frameworks (see Chapter IV). Furthermore, countries should 
continue to take advantage of the favourable international environment to improve the 
resilience of banking systems to adverse external and domestic shocks. 
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